Redes Sociais

Charles G. Finney
(29/08/1792 - 16/8/1875)

The Oberlin Evangelist ~ 1848

Appearing in the Oberlin Evangelist ordered by date

May 24, 1848


BRO. MAHAN: The following letter is from an esteemed brother, the object of which you will see at once. As many minds feel the same difficulties, I have thought it might be useful to reply in few words through the Evangelist. How long shall our brother neglect to examine our views so as to understand us? Will you give the following letter, interspersed with remarks of my own, a place in your paper?

Yours, C.G. FINNEY



"I have read with deep interest some of your many publications, and I am exceedingly gratified with your system of theology in the main. Your views of moral obligation, human ability &c., I have advocated for years. But then there are certain features of your system, which I either do not understand, or can not as yet approve. They seem newer then the New Theology which I advocate, and which I regard as both new and old, and immensely important. I can not preach the gospel without it, and although I have read the writings of my Oberlin brethren on this subject, with some care, I have as yet obtained no satisfaction from them. Indeed they do not reach my difficulties at all. I have often thought of writing to you respecting them; but I have delayed doing it until now, thinking your time was too fully occupied to admit of your giving heed to such communications. At the suggestion of brother ---- however, I have concluded to write, with assurance that I shall consider it no offence if, in the midst of your numerous engagements you can find no time to make me reply either by private letter, or in the Oberlin Evangelist. My difficulties relate to the Simplicity of Moral Action. If I understand you at Oberlin, you teach that all such action is simple--either right or wrong, and either just right or just wrong. Hence come your views of Entire Sanctification--your interpretation of the 7th chapter of Romans, and your efforts to reform and improve us of the Presbyterian Church. Now I do not know how to present the views which I wish you to correct, if wrong, better than by giving you the skeletons or heads of two discourses I have prepared on this subject. In many respect you will perceive, I suppose, a perfect agreement between our views, and in other respects a total, and important disagreement."

The text is Matt. 5:48--"Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven, is perfect."

Upon the above paragraphs I would remark,

That this esteemed brother errs in supposing that our views of Entire Sanctification in this life follow from, or are founded in, our theory of the Simplicity of Moral Action. We believe, as Professor Upham once said, that "that doctrine is true upon any philosophy." That is, the doctrine of Entire Sanctification in this life is plainly revealed in the Bible, and is therefore a true doctrine, whatever the philosophy of it may be. We at Oberlin, it is true, give a different philosophical account of the doctrine from that which Prof. Upham gives. But we alike hold the doctrine as a truth plainly revealed in the Bible, though we differ in the philosophical explanation of it. We hold the doctrine in accordance with New School Theology. That is, we hold that all moral action is voluntary, and that, strictly speaking, moral action consists in the ultimate intention, or in the devotion or consecration of the soul to an end of life. Our brother holds that the involuntary states of mind have moral character, and therefore that sanctification properly speaking must extend to them. We hold that strictly speaking holiness or sanctification belongs only to acts of will and consequently that entire consecration is synonymous with present entire sanctification. We hold to the necessity of the same purifying baptism of which he speaks and writes as indispensable to the rectification of the intellect and the sensibility, or in other words the rectification of the involuntary powers and states of mind. But we hold that this work in the involuntary powers, states and susceptibilities is rather a consequence of sanctification than a part of it. We hold that natural ability extends strictly speaking only to voluntary states of mind, and that consequently sanctification in so far as it is an immediate duty can extend only to voluntary action or choice. We hold that the moral or spiritual heart is a voluntary state, and that it consists in the ruling preference or ultimate intention of the soul. Hence we confine sanctification proper to the heart in our sense of the term. We hold as I have said that the involuntary powers and susceptibilities need rectifying by a divine influence, and hence we recognize all of which that brother speaks as being really genuine Christian experience, and rejoice greatly in what he says. He regards the heart as lying back of a voluntary state, or as we should express it as belonging to the sensibility. Consequently and consistently with his philosophy he regards sanctification proper as including both voluntary and involuntary acts and states of mind. We receive all that he inculcates as really belonging to Christian experience. The difference between us consists in this, that we regard some things rather as a result of sanctification, when this term is used strictly, and as synonymous with holiness, which he regards as included in it. We have no controversy therefore with Prof. Upham, but most cordially receive his works with all joy, notwithstanding the above discrepancy in our philosophical explanations of the doctrine of entire sanctification. The author of this letter is mistaken therefore in supposing that our confidence in the truthfulness of entire sanctification in this life is founded in, or necessarily connected with our views of the simplicity of moral action.

The following is the abstract of the sermons of this brother upon the text above cited.

"Christianity is a gorgeous climax. Its precepts, virtues and joys all ascending.

I. What exactly does the text require?

II. Can we attain unto its perfection?

III. Do we ever attain unto it on earth?

IV. Should we make the attempt, under the rational expectation of success?

V. If not, are we not discouraged from exertion?


I. What, then, is the perfection required?

1. Not a mental one.

2. Nor a physical one.

3. Nor one of animal propensities. A man is a compound being, namely; he has a soul, and an animal nature. That which is born of the Spirit is Spirit, that is, soul--not animal nature. But that which is born of flesh is flesh, namely, animal nature. This animal, or carnal nature is not regenerated. It may be controlled by the regenerated soul, but it remains after regeneration, with its appetites, propensities &c. Hence Paul says, I am carnal, not carnally-minded, but carnal, that is, I have these animal appetites--these motions of the flesh. These animal appetites are called by Old School men, sinful nature--original sin. But they have no sinfulness about them, only when improperly indulged by the soul. Their depraved or vitiated condition may be the result of sin; and when thus vitiated, they may occasion sin. But animal nature is not, in itself, a sin, that is, a transgression of God's law, whether found in men, or tigers, or snakes.

The text does not, then, require perfection of animal nature, for this is often beyond our reach.

4. Nor does it require an imperfectly moral one, granting some indulgence to human infirmities--for human infirmities are provided for in the atonement of Christ, but not in the law , or commandments of God.

5. Nor does the perfection consist in a perfect deliverance from our obligations to obey either the law or the gospel, saying to the regenerated soul, eat, drink, and be merry, for you now are under no restraint or condemnation.

a. Christianity delivers us from the bondage of the law--that is, from the terrific hardship of struggling through its deeds into heaven, with all those load of sins upon our shoulders.

b. But christianity delivers us not from our obligation to obey its holy precepts.

c. It rather confirms these obligation, and puts on our necks another yoke--that is, Christ.

In coming out from the bondage of the law, we come not into the liberty of a regenerated licentiousness. As it is with the Irish emigrant, on his way to our shores, so it is with us--we leave not one government for the sake of no government at all.

5. [6.] The perfection indeed required is a sinless one, namely; It is one in which we are to feel, and to act, just right at all times and under all circumstances, and in our spheres, and up to the full measure of our capacities just as God feels and acts in his sphere, and with his capacities--so much superior to his own.

This is our definition of the perfection required, and we refer here only to moral feeling and action."


This brother professes to be New School; but here, as elsewhere, he speaks of moral feelings. In several parts of these sermons he regards holiness as belonging to the feelings and actions. Is this New School? I had supposed that New School men held that the feelings were involuntary, and that strictly speaking, moral character does not belong to involuntary states of mind. We shall by and by see that this brother is sometimes New School in this respect, while here and elsewhere he is or seems to be Old School. Much of his difficulty with our views seems to be traceable to this discrepancy in his own. But he proceeds:


"That such is the required perfection is evident from the following considerations.

1. Infinite perfection can require no less.

2. We require as much from our children when we do right.

3. The Bible says expressly, sin not.

II. Now, can we attain this perfection here? Yes, for,

1. God requires it.

2. If we could not attain it, then we would be sinful of necessity.

3. But our very definition shows, that we can, that is, have ability to attain it; for it is a perfection only up to the measure of our abilities, and no more.

III. Do we ever on earth become thus perfect--perfect as God is?

This exactly, and no other, either more or less, or different is the question now.

1. In answering it some have referred us to the epistle of John, where we are told, "Whosoever is born of God doth not sin."

But if these passages teach sinless perfection,

1. They do it in behalf of all the regenerated, for the language is whosoever.

2. They also teach that all the regenerated are always perfect, for God's seed remainth in them, and they cannot sin.

3. They teach too, that with the regenerated, sin is an impossibility. They cannot sin.

4. Nor can they fall from grace.

5. Nor backslide.

6. Nor was Peter, Paul, Daniel, David or Moses born again, for they all sinned.

But these passages teach only, that the truly regenerated are not the every day, habitual doers, or practicers of iniquity, like other men.

II. But you ask, if all moral feeling and action is not sinful or holy--right or wrong--and just right, or just wrong--entirely sinful or entirely holy.

You ask, moreover, whether if this be true, all Christians must not be perfect in what holy emotions and virtuous deeds they actually put forth, however common, or unfrequent, or transient, or protracted they may be."


Here again this writer regards the feelings and emotions as holy or sinful, and speaks as if all holiness belonged to the feelings, emotions, and outward actions. Is this New Schoolism? Does this brother think that he understands our views, or that he is a consistent New School man? This letter shows that neither is true. How can this esteemed brother say that he understands, approves, and has long preached the same views that I hold upon the foundation of moral obligation and yet preach as he has in these sermons? Surely this looks like any thing rather than preaching what I inculcate upon the subject of the foundation of moral obligation. The fact is, this dear brother must sit down to a more thorough investigation of this subject, and first take himself to task and more thoroughly understand himself and be more thoroughly self-consistent before he will understand us. He proceeds:


1. "We answer, If such be the fact then those who adopt the theory should no longer deny, that they teach the doctrine of sinless perfection, AS A LIVING reality of frequent occurrence.

2. Nor should they object, if when they proclaim themselves less perfect than God is--we charge them on the ground of their own theory with being as bad as the devil is; for surely, if they are not entirely holy, they must be according to their own views, entirely unholy, and Satan is no worse only in capacity.

3. It also may be said, if all moral feeling and action is just right or just wrong, then all christians are,

(1.) As perfect all the time in their spheres, and with their capacities, as God is, in his sphere, and with his capacities; or

(2.) They are as bad as Satan is some of the time;

(3.) Or they shift about from holiness to sin, and from sin to holiness--from regeneration to apostacy, and from apostacy to regeneration as their days pass along.

[1.] But who believes that all Christians are as perfect as God is all the time?

[2.] Or who believes in regenerated apostles, bad as the devil is?

[3.] Our only alternative then, is in the supposition that these ever shifting affairs are Christians now of the first class, and now no Christians at all--now regenerated, and now not born again--now in the kingdom of God most beloved, and now fallen from grace, in the kingdom of Satan, most abhorred.

But where is the safety in trusting such ever shifting affairs in the kingdom of God, with its schools, colleges, theological seminaries and all important missions. As well might the man that is afflicted with epileptic fits be trusted with the steam engine of the Isaac Newton.

The only safety, then, is in having God's kingdom placed, under God, in the hands of those, who are kept by his mighty power, all the time, from becoming entirely sinful."


Was David partly holy at the time of his seduction of Bathsheba and murder of Uriah? A man may be safely entrusted in the most responsible stations although he may commit adultery and murder, because he is partly holy all the time. Of what avail is such a holiness? He can not be trusted in responsible stations unless he is partly holy all the time. But this partial holiness it seems is consistent with the deliberate commission of adultery and murder. How much better is this partial holiness all the time than total depravity some of the time and entire obedience the most of the time? Will the brother inform us? Why not "make the tree good and its fruit good, or the tree corrupt and its fruit corrupt? Can a fountain at the same time and place send forth sweet water and bitter?" He proceeds:


"We then are driven back upon the ground, (if we adopt the theory in question) of supposing the born again are perfect all the time. But this, we learn, both from their deeds, and acknowledgments, is not the fact.

The theory then is a mistake. We are not sure but that the Christian has a mixed moral character--feeling and acting under the joint influence of various motives--some coming from God, and some from the world, the flesh, and the devil."


Here again, as all along, thus far, this brother seems to regard the moral character as belonging to the feelings and outward actions, in neither of which strictly speaking is there any moral character at all. Moral character can not be with strict propriety predicated either of muscular action or involuntary feelings. This he elsewhere admits as we shall see. I enquire again how this writer can claim to be New School? He proceeds:


"By motive we mean any thing that moves to action; an animal appetite, or passion, or propensity is a motive; physical power is a motive. The idea of glorifying God, or injuring men, of pleasing our friends, or displeasing our enemies all are motives.

We make a distinction between them and intentions. A motive, in itself, may have no moral character, such as an animal propensity. But there is moral character to an intention. The motive may be an idea, and thought, and consideration before the mind, to be cherished or resisted as the mind pleases--like the motives Satan presented to Christ. An intention is an act of the will. The motive occasions the intention. But the intention occasions not the motive. It precedes and occasions the after overt act. For we can not pray, nor steal, nor act any how, in a moral way, without intention.

Now why may there not be many motives combined, in the production of a single intention, or purpose or act of the will? The act may be simple and single--a perfect unit. But can not a unit be the result or effect of several causes--may not many streams make one river?

Now motives are the fountains of all moral character, (not intention, for their fountain springs are in the motive.)

Destroy human life as an officer of Justice, at the command of the Judge, and from the motive of promoting public good, and you are no murderer. Do it, however, from motives of maliciousness and you are a murderer.

The Bible makes this distinction--pray, fast, give under the idea of being seen by men, and you have one character. Do it from holy motives and you have another character.

If then the moral character both of our intention and overt acts depends on our motives, and if various motives may unite in the production of a single act of the will, our moral character on the whole, will be of a mixed complexion, like the Mississippi at New Orleans."


Here we get at the first glimpse of light in the mind of this brother upon the subject of moral action; and there is error here--such a commingling of light and darkness, of truth and error, that several remarks are called for to straighten out the kinks in this writer's mind. Here he acknowledge that all morality belongs properly to the intention. I suppose he means the ultimate intention or choice of an end. This is what I hold. I also hold that the executive volitions or those efforts of the will which are put forth to secure the intended end have no moral character in them, except in so far forth as they partake of the character of the intention that necessitates them. Upon the above paragraph of this letter I remark,

1. That motives may be objective or subjective. The objective motive is the consideration that induces or occasions intention, be it what it may. The subjective motive is identical with the intention. This brother here speaks of objective motive. We often mean by motive the intention or subjective motive. Thus we say that we are to judge a man by his motives, that is, his intentions.

2. This brother is greatly inconsistent with himself. He holds that moral character does not belong to the objective motive, and yet that is does. At one breath, he affirms, and correctly too, that moral character does not belong to the motive that occasions intention, and in the next breath he maintains that it does. Here is his error. If he will but be self-consistent his difficulty will disappear. He admits that his intention "may be simple and single, a perfect unit," and yet that this simple act of will or this simple intention may proceed from divers motives, and consequently have a mixed moral character, corresponding with the good or bad motives that occasioned it. What is this but holding that character belongs to the objective motive, or to that consideration, whatever it may be, in view of which the mind chooses or forms the intention. Moral character belongs solely to the intention itself, as distinguished from the objective motive. If the right thing or end be intended, the intention is right. If the wrong thing or end is intended, the intention is wrong. In other words, if the mind chooses or intends that which it ought to intend, the intention is right. If it intend that which it ought not to intend, the intention is wrong. To be partly right and partly wrong, that is, to be of a mixed character, the intention must embrace opposite ends at the same time; the mind must choose at the same time opposite ends. But this I have abundantly shown in my theology to be naturally impossible. This brother admits that the intention "may be simple and single, a perfect unit," and yet contends that it may have a mixed moral character. But what does he mean by "simple, single, a perfect unit"? Does he mean that the intention terminates on a single end? If so, it cannot have a mixed character. If by "simple," &c., he means that one intention may terminate on or embrace diverse and opposite ends, I reply, first: That such an intention could not be simple, or a unit. If opposite ends are intended, there must be as many intentions as there are conflicting ends. One and the same will cannot form and maintain these opposite intentions at the same time. But if there is but one end intended, and that end be that which God requires to be intended, the intention is simple, and wholly right, whatever considerations might have been employed in preparing the way for it. It is a contradiction to affirm that the intention can terminate on a single end, and yet the moral character of the intention be partly holy and partly sinful, in consequence of the diverse considerations that were concerned in inducing it. The question is, What does the mind intend? I care not what objective motives may present themselves, the question is, Does the mind intend to realize them? Suppose the mind intends to glorify God, and to promote the highest good of being. This is its end. This is what it intends or aims to realize. Now, if this is its simple intention, it matters not at all what considerations may have prepared the way and led to this intention. Were it not impossible and absurd in itself, we might suppose that the vilest and most selfish consideration might have led to the formation of this intention. Yet the thing intended is just that which God requires to be intended, and is, therefore, just right. Observe, character does not belong to the objective motive, but to the intention. It is indeed an absurdity and a contradiction to say that there can be a selfish reason for a benevolent intention; but if there could be such a thing, the intention would be right if it were truly benevolent, whatever motives might have occasioned it--for, by this brother's admission, moral character belong not to the objective motive, but to the intention. It is really nonsense to talk of a single or simple intention being occasioned by opposing objective motives. It is a contradiction. If there be opposing ends, there must be opposing intentions. This can not be at the same time. If there be but one end, and this end be benevolent, it is and must be right, and it is absurd to say that it is occasioned by opposing objective motives.

If it were really occasioned by opposing considerations it must follow that the mind has yielded to those opposing consideration and intends in accordance with them. But this is to admit that the mind has diverse and conflicting ends in view, that is, that it intends or aims to realize these opposing ends at the same time which is impossible and a contradiction.

There is, as I said, great confusion in this brother's mind upon this subject. When he admits that the intention may be "simple, single, a perfect unit," and still contends that the intention may have a mixed character, because of the diverse considerations or objective motives that may have occasioned it, he wholly forgets his admission that moral character does not at all attach to the objective motives, but wholly to the intention. The reasons, objective motives, or considerations that occasion choice are the real objects or ends chosen. These can not be opposed to each other, and the intention be occasioned by them without involving the absurdity of choosing opposing ends at the same time. If this brother will consider this subject attentively, and read what I have said upon it in my second volume of theology, and understand it, I think his difficulties will vanish. Professor Cochran has, I think forever settled the question of the simplicity of moral action in his pieces in the Oberlin Quarterly Review. Will not the brother read them all, from May, 1846 to February, 1848.

2. But since the brother admits that moral character belongs to the intention and yet holds that Christians are partly holy all the time, I should like to know what holy intention David could have had in seduction, and murder. Had he at that time a holy intention or one that was partly holy? He must have had if he was partly holy all the time. The same might be said of all sin. Has the sinner at the time he sins an intention partly holy? It can not be.


He proceeds:

"The theory, then, that all moral feeling and action is just right or just wrong remains to be proved.

But we have still other objections to the doctrine of sinless perfection.

1. There is, we think, an approximation towards the blasphemous in the theory, for if it be true, there is an equality in moral worth, between man and his Maker.

In sphere and capacity or altitude of position there may be a difference.

But does extent of capacity, or altitude of position increase the quality of the perfect?

Can you add to the quality of the perfect, by increasing the amount?

Is not one grain of perfect wheat as good, in quality, as a million bushels, in large measures.

Perfection, then, in you, such as the text requires, renders it proper for us to say of you, that you are as perfect as God is. Your moral perfection, in quality, is equal to his. But what is a claiming of equality with God in this respect, but a bordering on the blasphemous? Who would endure such boasting on the part of his pastor?"


Indeed! The brother holds that God requires this perfection. That this perfection is possible to us, but, should we do, and profess to do as we are required, it would be blasphemous.

Surely such teaching as this in these sermons must sound strangely to an audience.

He takes for his text "be ye perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect." He shows,

1. What this perfection is not.

2. What it is.

3. That it is attainable or possible.

4. That it is a solemn duty.

5. That we ought to aim at it, and to intend to be thus perfect, and,

6. That should we be thus perfect, and profess to obey God it were blasphemous!

Does God require what would be so wicked? Alas, for such a requirement. And alas, for such preaching! He proceeds:


"2. But again, if we are perfect, we should look upon ourselves with perfect complacency.

3. More--with prefect admiration.

4. We should confess no sin.

5. Ask no pardon.

6. Aim at no higher moral worth. We should look only for greater capabilities--a higher position.

7. But what prophet, apostle or broken-hearted man ever took such positions in the church of God?

(1.) Moses entered not in because of unbelief.

(2.) Job abhorred himself.

(3.) David was a gross offender.

(4.) Daniel was a man of unclean lips.

(5.) Peter denied Christ.

(6.) Paul had not attained.

(7.) All came short.

(8.) All were to pronounce themselves unprofitable.

(9.) All were bent on backsliding.

(10.) All made confession--asked forgiveness, and were deceived if they said they had no sin.

It remains for modern reformers to excel them all.

IV. But may we not strive for perfection under the rational expectation of success? We answer--

Things may be possible, which it is not rational to expect, namely,

(1.) It is possible for devils to repent. But it is not rational to expect it.

(2.) God has ability to do many things which we can not rationally expect of Him.

(3.) It is possible for impenitent men to reform after death. But is it rational to expect it?

(4.) It is possible for the drunkard to cease from the use of strong drink, even while tending the worst groggery in New York.

(5.) It is possible for your once profligate, but now reclaimed son, with all his former animal propensities about him, clamoring for indulgence--to withstand temptation, and grow in grace, although you place him among wine, cards, gamblers, prostitutes, and all that is unfavorable to his religious improvement. But is it rational for you to expect it of him?

We think it is not rational to expect success where all others have failed--no matter what may be the ability or the obligation.

We think, moreover, that the infirmities, propensities, and temptations of the Christian, on earth, are so unfavorable to his religious welfare, that he never yet, in one instance, has become as perfect as is his Father in heaven.

We also think that the very best specimen of a human being, next to Christ, that was ever created--the model-man of earth--Adam--placed in the very best circumstances, with no vitiated animal propensities about him, did not, when exposed to the temptations with which we are beset--retain the perfection which he previously enjoyed.

Now is it rational to expect that we, whose condition, in all respect is so much more unfavorable than his, will succeed in attaining what he lost?"


Indeed! Because Adam did not abide in holiness under a legal covenant, it is irrational for us to expect to do so under a covenant of grace. Because the church and the world have been no better, it is irrational for them to expect ever to be. This is a non-sequiter. The logic of this Brother needs to be bathed in the light of revelation. Will the Brother read Sys. Theol. pp. 314-371.


"And yet we teach both the ability and the obligation of attaining the utmost.

V. But how can we strive with zeal and energy after an object we cannot rationally expect to secure? We reply--

This is a common occurrence.

1. The Third Party strove hard to elect J.G. Birney as President of the United States. But did they expect to succeed?

2. Every artist, mechanic, farmer,--if he acts as he should--strives for perfection. But do they expect success?"


This is a mistake. The third party did not intend to elect J.G. Birney. They knew they could not and should not; they only intended to get for him as large a vote as they could, looking forward, as a party, to ultimate success in electing a candidate, but they neither expected nor intended to elect him at that time.

This is also true of every artist. They never intend to be perfect, but to do as well as they can, knowing and expecting to fall short of perfection in their various arts.

It can never be said with truth that they intend to be perfect.

In no case whatever, does or can any one intend to do what he believes to be impossible. He proceeds:


"So should the Christian strive for perfection. For it is one of his peculiarities to walk by faith and principle, and not by sight.

He inquires not--

How do others act? What have they done? How do they succeed? What will they think? Will I succeed if I try?--But

Is it right? Is it desirable? Does God demand it?--and if so, he arises at once and does his utmost amid the greatest discouragements. So christianity ever conducts.

Now, we say--

Walk by faith--by principle--not by sight or impulse or expectation of success.

Ask--is my perfection desirable--Is it right--Does God demand it--Have I all the needful powers--Can I attain?

If so, be up and doing--aim at the highest and never faint.

You will perceive from these brief notes, wherein my difficulties consist. Do they not all arise from your views about the simplicity of moral action--about the entire sinfulness or holiness of every moral action? Can you enlighten or correct me?"


The fact is, that the doctrine of the simplicity of moral action follows by the sternest necessity from the new school doctrine of the nature of sin and holiness. If all morality belongs, strictly speaking, to actions of will, it must follow that it belongs strictly to ultimate intention. All intelligent acts of will consist in the choice of an end or of the means or conditions of an end. It can not consist in mere executive volitions but must consist in the ultimate or choice of an end. Opposite ends can not be chosen at the same time. If moral character belongs to voluntary action, then it must be simple, and the only question as to its being wholly right or wholly wrong, must respect, not, as this writer supposes, the objective motives by which the intention is occasioned, not caused, but it must respect the strength or intensity of the intention. This is the only question that can be raised on new school principles, with a shadow of consistency. This question I will not now argue, because this writer does not urge it, and because Prof. Cochran has so fully discussed and settled it in the pieces above referred to, and because I have so fully argued it in my Theology. So far as this brother's objection is concerned, it involves not only an absurdity in itself, but also, an entire contradiction of the fundamental position of new schoolism.

I must not pursue this subject further. I might notice several other things, but have neither time or room. I doubt not that this will be received as fraternally as it is intended.

Your brother,



N.B. Will not this Brother feel it his duty to correct the impression that these sermons made.



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