Redes Sociais

Charles G. Finney
(29/08/1792 - 16/8/1875)





1. What is philosophy?

2. What is moral philosophy?

3. What are morals?

4. What are the conditions of morals?

5. What is a moral agent?

6. What is law?

7. What is moral law?

8. What are its essential parts?

9. What is precept?

10. What are sanctions?

11. Are sanctions remuneratory and vindictory?

12. Do. natural and governmental?

13. What is intended by this distinction?

14. Is the design of sanctions of law benevolent?

15. Is the execution of penalties, in support of law, benevolent?

16. By what criterion ought sanctions of law to be graduated?

17. Can the execution of penal sanctions ever be dispensed with under a moral government?

18. If so, upon what conditions?

19. What are the attributes of moral law?

20. What is moral obligation?

21. What is implied in moral obligation?

22. How do you know that all this is implied?

23. What is a first truth?

24. Over what does moral law primarily legislate?

25. What secondarily?

26. What is a moral action?

27. What is an ultimate choice, or intention?

28. Is moral obligation self-imposed?

29. Is it imposed also by God?

30. How self-imposed?

31. What is a ground or foundation of moral obligation?

32. What is a condition of obligation as distinct from a ground?

33. Are there diverse forms of obligation?

34. What are they?

35. Are there diverse conditions of those forms of obligation, and what are they?

36. Is any form of obligation universal?

37. Is there any universal ground of obligation?

38. What does the moral law require?

39. What must be the end proposed by the law?

40. Can obedience be this end?

41. Can virtue?

42. Can good character?

43. What do you mean by an ultimate good?

44. What must be the ground of obligation to be benevolent?

45. Do. to choose the conditions and means?

46. Do. to put forth efforts to secure this good?

47. Is benevolence always right per se?

48. Is anything else right per se?

49. Can the will of God be a ground of obligation?

50. Can it be a condition of obligation?

51. If so, when?

52. Can right be a ground of obligation?

53. Can the utility of an act be a ground of obligation?

54. Can moral character be a ground of obligation?

55. Can any relation be a ground of obligation?

56. Can relations be conditions of certain forms of obligation?

57. Can the affirmation of obligation by the conscience be a ground?

58. Can susceptibility for enjoyment be a ground of obligation?

59. Can any susceptibility whatever be a ground?

60. Can susceptibility be a condition of obligation?

61. Can the nature and relation of things be a ground?

62. Can the perception of any relation whatever be a ground?

63. Can it be a condition?

64. Can the relation of intrinsic fitness existing between choice and an ultimate object of choice be a ground?

65. Are both this relation and the perception of it, conditions of obligation?

66. What relation can good moral character sustain to obligation to will the good of one of holy character?

67. What relation does the relation of benefactor sustain to obligation to exercise gratitude?

68. Can known veracity be a ground of obligation to believe a veracious being?

69. Is it a condition of such obligation?

70. Is the will necessitated to act, in some way, in the presence of every truth?

71. What truths perceived must necessitate the action of the will in conformity with, or in opposition to it?

72. Wherein does the freedom of the will consist in such cases?

73. What is the ground of obligation to will in conformity, and not contrary to truth?

74. What are the conditions of such obligation?

75. Wherein does all true virtue consist?

76. Has benevolence certain inherent attributes?

77. What are some of them?

78. Can moral obligation be wholly and honestly denied by any moral agent?

79. Can it honestly be denied in any case whatever?

80. Can a moral agent ever honestly mistake the path of duty?

81. Can he honestly commit a blunder that will involve sin?

82. What must be the logical consequences of mistaking the ground of obligation?

83. By what criterion can we estimate the extent or degree of obligation?

84. Do. the guilt of violating obligation?

85. Does the merit of compliance with, equal the guilt of violating obligation?

86. If not, why not?

87. Do moral agents necessarily affirm the intrinsic value of the good of universal being to be infinite?

88. How great is the obligation to exercise benevolence?

89. How great is the guilt of violating this obligation?

90. What constitutes full obedience to moral law?

91. What constitutes disobedience to moral law?

92. What is selfishness?

93. What is malevolence?

94. Is malevolence, strictly speaking, possible?

95. Has selfishness inherent attributes?

96. What are some of them?

97. Does all virtue resolve itself into unselfish benevolence?

98. Does all sin resolve itself into selfishness?

99. How do the attributes or qualities of benevolence and selfishness manifest themselves?

100. Can anything be a sin, or a crime, that does not involve selfishness?

101. Can anything be truly right that does not imply and involve benevolence?

102. Should all crimes--theft, murder, lying, slave-holding, war etc., for example--be so defined as necessarily to imply selfishness?

103. Should all true virtues be so defined as necessarily to imply unselfish benevolence?

104. Can anything be sin that proceeds from benevolent intention?

105. Can any act be virtuous that proceeds from selfish intention?

106. Does the end sanctify the means in any sense; if so, in what sense?

107. In what sense cannot the end sanctify the means?

108. Are we under moral obligation to obey human enactments?

109. When?

110. What is the ground of this obligation?

111. What are the conditions of this obligation?

112. What are the limits of this obligation?

113. Is it ever duty to disobey human enactments?

114. when, and why?

115. Is revolution ever a duty?

116. When, and why?

117. What is the ground of obligation to obey parents?

118. How far does this obligation extend?

119. How does it cease?

120. What are the conditions of the right to govern in any case?

121. What is implied in this right?

122. When does the right to govern cease in any and every case?

123. Does true morality imply true piety to God?

124. Does true piety imply true morality?

125. Does true morality in one who has sinned imply repentance?

126. Can a sinner remaining impenitent perform a truly moral act?

127. Is prayer to God a duty?

128. What is the ground of this obligation?

129. What is implied in a right discharge of this duty?

130. Can any duty to God or man be truly performed while this one is neglected?

131. Can any one duty be truly performed to God or man while any other duty is neglected?

132. Does the right performance of duty in any case, imply entire honesty of heart with God and man?

133. What is implied in moral honesty?

134. Can that be moral philosophy that overlooks the attributes of moral law?

135. Do. That mistakes the ground of obligation?

136. Do. That does not regard true morality as necessarily involving true piety, and vice versa?

137. Do. That denies the true freedom of the will?

138. What is the true doctrine of expediency?

139. Can true expediency ever conflict with justice?

140. Do. With right?

141. What is the true idea of retribution?

142. Do. Of disciplinary inflictions?

143. Do. Of punishment?

144. Can the spirit of moral law ever consist with the pardon of transgression? If so, on what conditions?

145. Upon these conditions does the spirit of moral law demand the pardon of transgression?

146. If this were not so could the exercise of mercy in pardoning transgression be other than sinful?

147. What would be a work of supererogation?

148. Is such a work possible?

149. Could such a work be other than sinful?

150. What is true self-denial?

151. Is it ever a duty?

152. Would self-denial in any case be sin; if so, when?

153. Is love to enemies always a duty?

154. Is ill-will ever right?

155. What is veracity?

156. Is it ever right to falsify?

157. Is the love of an enemy necessarily inconsistent with willing evil to him?

158. Is anger ever right; if so, what kind and when?

159. What is the distinction between the letter and the spirit of moral law?

160. Can the spirit of the law ever require a violation of its letter?

161. Can it ever be right to intend deception?

162. How can we determine the path of duty in regard to the outward life?

163. Can we ever determine what is truly benevolent by referring a given question to our sense of justice?

164. Do. To our sense of obligation to tell the truth?

165. What is conscience?

166. To what does it primarily extend its jurisdiction?

167. Is it infallible within its sphere?

168. How far are we to obey our spontaneous convictions of right and duty?

169. Can we ever sinfully err in obeying these convictions; if so, why and when?

170. Ought we ever to act against our convictions of right?

171. Can we always tell what is upon the whole for the highest good of being?

172. When we can not tell what act or course of conduct will tend to secure the highest good, how are we to decide upon what course is right and duty?

173. Can we, in such cases, be secure against sinful errors?


  Back to Charles Finney